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Abstract To explore whether market reforms in a health care system affect
medical professional ethics of hospital-based specialists on the one hand and phy-
sicians in independent practices on the other. Qualitative interviews with 27 sur-
geons and 28 general practitioners in The Netherlands, held 2–3 years after a major
overhaul of the Dutch health care system involving several market reforms. Sur-
geons now regularly advertise their work (while this was forbidden in the past) and
pay more attention to patients with relatively minor afﬂictions, thus deviating from
codes of ethics that oblige physicians to treat each other as brothers and to treat
patients according to medical need. Dutch GPs have abandoned their traditional
reticence and their fear of medicalization. They now seem to treat more in accor-
dance with patients’ preferences and less in accordance with medical need. Market
reforms do affect medical professional principles, and it is doubtful whether these
changes were intended when Dutch policy makers decided to introduce market
elements in the health care system. Policy makers in other countries considering
similar reforms should pay attention to these results.
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Mid October 2009 general practitioner Sandra Bijl published an article in the Dutch
doctors’ journal Medisch Contact.She described one ofthe many dilemmas shefaced
since the introduction of marketized health care in The Netherlands. Doctor Bijl’s
practice consists of many immigrant patients, with a low education and a low income.
Many of them are single mothers, struggling to keep their families aﬂoat and former
refugees who suffered personal losses in their country of origin that they still do not
know how to deal with. They visit their family doctor very frequently. Dr. Bijl: ‘‘Of
course I can just pay attention to their physical pains. Quick service and they will get
backverysoon.AsanentrepreneurImightsaythatthiswouldbeproﬁtable:littleeffort
and lots of beneﬁts for me. But as a human being devoted to her profession this would
not satisfy me. One of my patients has been suffering from headaches for the past
12 years. Not because of a tumor, or high blood pressure or bad eyesight, but because
hergrownupchildrenusetheirmotherastheirpersonalslave.SoIlistenedtoherandI
talkedtoher.Ittookme30 min,andIwillnotgetpaidforallofthem.Sheusedtovisit
me once every fortnight, but since the talk I haven’t seen her for months. As an
entrepreneurIfailifIdeliverthistypeofcare,butasaprofessional,aconversationlike
that is very rewarding.’’ [4] abbreviated and translated by the authors).
During the 1990s and the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century many
governments in Western European countries introduced market elements in their
health care systems. Numerous politicians and policy-makers argued that health care
should be ‘consumer-driven’ and ‘consumer-oriented’. Care providers should
become entrepreneurial; they should cater according to consumer preferences with
regard to prices and quality of care. Several authors have observed that these changes
may lead to changes in medical professional ethics. Eliot Freidson points out that the
logic of professionalism differs from the logic of market consumerism and from the
logic of bureaucratic managerialism. Professionals consider their work a secular
calling, not a mere job or a means to maximize their income, as the example of dr Bijl
shows. Professionals (and medical doctors are archetypal professionals) are devoted
to a transcendent value, such as the health of the patient (which is not the same as
fulﬁlling the patient’s wishes). Introducing consumerism or managerialism (or both)
may threaten ‘‘the soul of professionalism’’ [9]. Referring to Freidson Duyvendak
et al. [7] argue that policy changes may lead to a process of deprofessionalization.
Eve and Hodgkin [8] argue that rising consumerism and the creation of an internal
market within the British National Health Service will challenge doctors’ profes-
sional ethics. Krizova observes that marketization and other changes in health care
systems may lead to a decline of professional autonomy which might cause ‘‘a
decrease in altruistic or service-oriented attitudes towards patients’’ [11] Similar
concerns raised by a number of other authors, mostly medical ethicists, are discussed
by Randall and Williams [18]. Although there are also some dissenting opinions (e.g.
Garrett [10] argues that market principles need not destroy professional ethics
because sticking to one’s professional ethics might be the most proﬁtable strategy for
market actors in the long run and Applbaum [1] questions the use and legitimacy of
professional ethics in the ﬁrst place, thus would not deplore its demise), the general
feeling seems to be pessimistic.
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relatively scarce. In this article we will try to add some empirics to the debate on the
relationship between market principles and medical professional ethics.
In our study we set out to ascertain how market reforms have changed medical
professional ethics in The Netherlands. Within Western Europe The Netherlands has
gone farthest in introducing markets and managed competition in health care (cf. [3,
13, 19]), which makes the country very suitable for an empirical study of the
relationship between marketization and medical professional ethics. The details of
the new Dutch system as well as its economic effects have been discussed in several
other publications [2, 12, 14, 17, 22, 23]. For this study it is important to know that:
– Private insurers have to contract hospitals to deliver medical services. Some of
these services still have ﬁxed prices, others (mostly elective surgery: inguinal
ruptures, varicose veins, knee operations etc.) are freely negotiable;
– Private insurers have to attract clients by offering attractive packages. These
packages may include treatment guarantees (e.g. if you are diagnosed with
breast cancer, your health insurer may guarantee that you will get surgery within
2 weeks). These treatment guarantees may diminish physicians’ room to
manoeuvre with their operating schedules;
– The payment system for general practitioners has been changed, in a much more
fee-for-service direction. GPs who perform minor surgeries or who use new
diagnostic tools may charge much more for this service than they could before
2006. Policy makers hoped to accomplish a substitution effect as minor
surgeries in hospitals are more expensive than similar surgeries in GP practices.
Although the complete overhaul of the insurance system took place in 2006,
elements of market competition were introduced before that date. Medical
professionals in The Netherlands have a few years of experience with market
elements by now.
One year after the new insurance system was adopted the Council for Public
Health and Health Care (an advisory council to the government and one of the more
fervent proponents of the new system) observed that the introduction of market
elements in the Dutch health care system had enlarged the inﬂuence of insurers and
hospital managers on the attribution and the distribution of health care services. The
Council foresaw that further marketization might challenge medical professional
autonomy as well as medical ethical principles [6] and admonished policymakers
and professionals to be vigilant in this respect. In our research we wanted to ﬁnd out
what kind of market induced phenomena professionals encounter in their daily
work, how they feel about them and whether these phenomena would change
medical professional ethics.
Method
We chose to study two specialties within the medical profession that differ with
regard to their working conditions: general practitioners (GPs) and surgeons. We
assumed that both groups would have been confronted with the effects of
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surgeons because several operations have become the object of market negotiations
and may have been included in treatment guarantee packages.
Dutch GPs work in independent practices in the neighborhood of their patients.
Most Dutch citizens have their own GP whom they can consult for health-related
problems. Dutch surgeons work in hospitals. Patients are referred to surgeons by
their GP (who functions as a gatekeeper to hospital care). Surgical work is more
specialized than GP work and involves other contact with patients. We assumed that
working conditions might inﬂuence the way in which doctors are confronted with
elements of marketization. For example: GPs might be confronted most directly
with demanding patient-consumers whereas surgeons might have to deal with eager
hospital managers, looking for quick wins.
We chose to do qualitative research. This would allow us to ask respondents for
all sort examples of marketization they encountered in their work which we could
not construe beforehand. Moreover we could ask them to discuss these examples
and their ideas about them at length, thus allowing for more insights and more
nuance than would have been possible in a written questionnaire.
We performed 27 interviews with surgeons and 28 with general practitioners in
2008 and 2009. We strove to interview both male and female doctors, doctors of
different generations, doctors working in different regions of the country (more and
less urbanized) and surgeons working in different types of hospitals (academic
hospitals where surgeons have a ﬁxed salary as well as smaller hospitals ‘in the
periphery’ where surgeons get paid on a fee for service basis) We did not include
surgeons working in newly founded private clinics (zelfstandige behandelcentra)
who specialize in certain types of surgery (e.g. cosmetic surgery, eye surgery or
varicose vein surgery). Although these newly founded clinics may be considered a
direct result of marketization in health care we assumed that medical staff in these
clinics would be a special segment of the profession. We wanted to ﬁnd out how
market changes play out for rank and ﬁle medical professionals in ‘ordinary’
settings.
Obviously the number of respondents is too small to establish correlations (such
as: surgeons in the periphery are more affected by the marketization of health care
than surgeons operating in academic hospitals), but our attempt to achieve variation
will at least prevent us from drawing conclusions based on the experiences of one
particular type of doctors in one particular hospital or one speciﬁc municipality.
Table 1 provides an overview of the respondents and their background.
The interviews were semi-structured and part of a broader research project,
relating to two other topics besides marketization (the growing percentage of well
educated, well informed patients and the growing percentage of female doctors).
1
With regard to marketization we asked our respondents whether they had noticed
any changes in their work as an effect of marketization. Most respondents had an
understanding of what marketization meant in the context of Dutch health care in
1 See for an outline of the general project http://www.margotrappenburg.nl/onderzoek/project
beschrijving%20juni%202006.pdf.
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2 but for those respondents who asked for a
clariﬁcation we provided some examples, such as: more competition between care
providers, more marketing and public relations, fear of losing customers, shifting
priorities. After their ﬁrst answers we asked our respondents to elaborate. If they had
noticed change as a result of marketization we asked them to give examples and to
describe their thoughts and feelings about the changes they saw. If they had not
noticed any change we would ask them if they had witnessed changes outside their
direct environment, that is: in other hospitals, other GP practices, other parts of the
country or other specialties.
We did not speciﬁcally ask our respondents if they had noticed any bending or
breaching of medical professional principles, since such questions would be leading
in nature. However, we had considered three speciﬁc medical-ethical principles that
might change as a consequence of marketization. These principles were:
(1) The principle that physicians should regard other physicians as their ‘brothers’,
a moral norm which might change as a consequence of more and harsher
competition among doctors;
(2) The principle that patients ought to be treated according to urgency and
medical need, which might change if certain patients come to be more
proﬁtable than others and
(3) The ‘primum non nocere’, ﬁrst of all do no harm principle, which might
change because a more market oriented ethic could make physicians more
inclined to ‘sell’ unnecessary and thus potentially harmful treatments or
diagnostic interventions.
Table 1 Overview
of respondents 28 General practitioners
Male 15
Female 13
Between 25 and 40 9
Between 40 and 55 8






Between 25 and 40 9
Between 40 and 55 9
55 and older 9
Academic hospital (ﬁxed salary) 6
Non academic hospital (fee for service) 21
2 Of course it is difﬁcult to say whether respondents all had the same idea of marketization. We did not
ask our respondents for deﬁnitions. However, we asked them to give examples of marketization in their
daily work and many of them came up with the same examples.
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The interviews were transcribed verbatim and were then analysed in a two phase
model. During the ﬁrst phase the ﬁrst author coded the interview material using the
computer programme Atlas-ti. Atlas-ti allows the researcher to ﬁrst establish broad
categories and then subdivide these into smaller categories. For our research project
we used three broad categories, related to the three topics we wanted to investigate.
For this article we selected all interview fragments related to market developments
in the health care system (one of the three broader categories). The ﬁrst researcher
coded these fragments in smaller categories.
During the second phase the two other researchers read all interview transcrip-
tions and checked the codes attributed to the interview fragments by the ﬁrst
researcher, so as to enhance the validity of our analysis.
Results
Change or No Change?
Before we discuss the ﬁndings related to the three different principles it is important
to establish whether respondents saw any changes at all in their daily work, related
to marketization. Despite the fact that we selected our two professional groups
because we assumed that they would have been confronted with marketization
directly, a minority of respondents (1 surgeon and 7 GPs) reported that they did not
notice any difference caused by marketization in their day to day work. The surgeon
and two GPs explained that in certain environments it was possible to ignore the
changes.
Many people seem to think, let them talk all they want, we will just do our
work (SU JV4).
In [my village] everything stays the same. People still have thirteen children
[…] I noticed no great difference. Perhaps changes just go past me (GP JV5,
p. 6–7, 36).
3
Two GPs found that the market elements in the new system were too small to
cause any real change, and the remaining three GPs explained that market elements
(such as marketing and competition) were also prominent when they ﬁrst started
their professional career.
When I ﬁrst started [other doctors] were very hesitant. There was certainly no
shortage of GPs, so it may be a bit much to say that you had to ﬁght your way
in, but for sure there was rivalry in the beginning (GP OM7, p. 38).
Female doctors were competitors back then. When I applied for this practice,
there was much resistance among other doctors, because in fact they did not
want to have a female colleague (GP OV3, p. 39).
3 The page numbers in the references at the end of interview quotations refer to our code books (the
interview transcriptions).
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Marketing Yourself (Advertising)
The most important change for surgeons, mentioned by eleven of them, pertained to
the fact that they now had to sell themselves, they had to advertise or market their
performance. Before the marketization took place the doctors’ association in The
Netherlands (the KNMG) had always stated that physicians should not draw
attention to themselves by advertisements. The doctors’ association saw to it that
doctors adhered to this rule. The introduction of market elements in Dutch health
care not only made the anti-advertisement principle obsolete, it actually made it
illegal for the doctors’ association to uphold this traditional rule of medical
professional ethics. Hence the fact that marketing was often mentioned as a major
change is not surprising.
Surgeons described the advent of several ways of marketing in health care. Some
of them did a visiting tour among GPs in the neighborhood, so as to encourage these
GPs to send their patients to their hospital.
4 One surgeon reported that his hospital
had managed (with quite some effort) to become the ﬁrst google hit for certain types
of operations. Other public relations activities involved publishing advertorials in
local newspapers, distributing leaﬂets, inviting a pop group to sing in the hospital to
generate more publicity and buying advertising space on the back of a local bus.
Two surgeons were quite positive about this change of practices:
So yes, well, you may be proud if you perform so well (SU JM1).
I always felt it was a pity that we could do absolutely nothing in terms of
advertising. You could not say on the radio: come over here, because we’re so
good at this or that. So yes, I rather like it that you can promote yourself now.
Because you do invest a lot in your work. And then, if you go home nobody
knows what good things you’ve been doing. So it feels good to make that
public (SU MV1, p. 12, 13).
Four others did not like the self promotion at all.
So basically you have to show off with your product, and I don’t like that at all
[…] because I think health care is not something fancy or popular, it’s just
something that has to be decent all around (SU JV3, p. 6–7).
The remaining surgeons regarded public relations and marketing as develop-
ments that were thrust upon them, to which they would have to adjust sooner or
later.
I don’t really like this whole idea of competition in health care but if we do it
all the same, then, perhaps you have to go along, and advertise. I don’t
4 Good relations between hospitals and GPs were important before marketization was introduced.
However, in the past, it was much more common for GPs to refer patients to the nearest hospital without
further ado. These days patients are encouraged to choose a hospital and GPs are supposed to help them
choose. This has made GP-hospital specialist relations more important.
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to, you have to (SU MV5, p. 21).
Among GPs the issue of marketing and commercials was less prominent,
although six of them mentioned this effect of marketization. One GP explained how
she tried to canvass new patients. She studied websites hosted by real estate
companies to ﬁnd out about new inhabitants in her neighborhood, she placed
advertisements in a students’ magazine and she distributed leaﬂets throughout her
neighborhood. Most GPs reported matter of factly about this new development.
Two GPs morally disapproved of the changes in professional attitude and
behavior.
I just want to be a kind and good doctor to people. But you can’t put that in a
leaﬂet. You don’t. So what should you advertise then? I would not want an
evening clinic or a drivers’ license medical examination as attention grabbers
for my practice (GP JM2, p. 49).
Shifting Priorities
Traditional medical professional ethics held that health care should be distributed
according to medical need. The Declaration of the Rights of the Patient of the World
Medical Association clearly states: ‘‘In circumstances where a choice must be made
between potential patients for a particular treatment which is in limited supply, all
such patients are entitled to a fair selection procedure for that treatment. That choice
must be based on medical criteria and made without discrimination’’ [26]. In The
Netherlands politicians orchestrated a public debate on choices in health care during
the 1980s and early 1990s which led to a Parliamentary conﬁrmation of the need
principle: if choices were necessary, medical care should go to those most in need of
it [20]. This principle has been reconﬁrmed by the Dutch doctors’ association ever
since [21]. Is this medical professional principle endangered by the market elements
in the new health care system?
Ten of the surgeons we interviewed mentioned that the new system made them
pay more attention to minor afﬂictions than they did in the past. Their hospitals had
invested in clinical paths and speedy treatment for patients suffering from varicose
veins and inguinal ruptures. The standardization of these simple treatments became
a number one priority.
We are organizing a clinical path for varicose veins. Together with the
dermatologist we are making a protocol. We want to see to it that if a patient
comes in he gets an examination straight away and then arrange the next
appointment right after that (SU MV3, p. 8).
Young colleagues of mine just announce: we’re gonna make a clinical path for
varicose veins and we’re gonna make big money there (SU DM 3, p. 16).
Less popular but also mentioned occasionally were special clinics for people who
had taken a fall, for people with urinary problems, and for obese patients hoping for
a stomach reduction. Six surgeons observed that the extra attention for routine
surgery was taken away from other patients or other medical duties.
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attention, at best (SU MV2, p. 12).
Right, and because one patient gets a speedy treatment, somebody else who
suffers from something else, will be helped later. That seems logical, don’t
you think? But I don’t hear anybody about that (SU OM3, p. 17).
We have indicated that bariatric surgery takes up a lot of time, and that we
have less time to spend on oncology. We have asked for extra time in
operating theatres to enlarge our capacity. Move bariatric surgery to the
evening or to the weekends even. We’re working on that (SU JV4, p. 3).
Among GPs investing extra resources seems to be a very prominent effect of
marketization. GPs do a lot of things that they did not do before the change of the
health care system. To be able to do so they invest in new equipment
(tympanometers to be able to measure ﬂuid behind the ear, ECG machines to be
able to make cardiograms, sophisticated 24/7 blood pressure meters) and they
employ personnel (administrative staff, a physician assistant or another GP). Twelve
of our GP respondents mentioned that they had bought new equipment or hired new
staff to be able to perform extra medical activities. Whereas surgeons testiﬁed about
a shift in priorities in favour of patients with minor afﬂictions, several GPs (n = 5)
witnessed a change for the better for patients with chronic conditions.
Marketization has led to an improvement in the care for the chronically ill.
Diabetes care, but even more clearly for COPD patients (GP MV3, p. 8).
In our practice we see it with diabetics. We do much more now. We test their
blood every 3 months. Check all the veins. It sounds much better. People are
examined much better (GP MM4, p. 11).
The improvement is probably due to the growing competition in the care for the
chronically ill. Diabetics and people with other chronic illnesses can sometimes
seek care in special clinics. When that happens, GPs miss them as well as the
income they generated.
I think it’s a pity that diabetics no longer visit a GP. And that they don’t see
their GP for their regular check up. Because if you come to your GP with some
ordinary condition I can ask you how you’re doing otherwise. To me those
were the nicest elements of GP practice and I know patients feel the same way
(GP OV4, p. 47).
Within GP practice the shift of priorities is much more in accordance with the
traditional distribution-according-medical-need principle. Spending extra money on
equipment and personnel probably leads to a net enlargement of the total amount of
medical care,
5 whereas the extra attention to people with chronic conditions might
conceivably be construed as offering extra care to those most in need (although this
remains debatable; if the extra services would be spent on diabetics rather than on
5 Research shows that the total amount of GP care as well as the costs involved have risen steadily since
the 2006 system change [25].
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hold).
Primum Non Nocere
One of the ﬁrst principles of medical professional ethics, featuring prominently in
the Hippocratic Oath is primum non nocere: ﬁrst of all, do no harm. It is a principle
that might be challenged by the introduction of market principles in health care. If a
patient wants a certain operation which the doctor thinks is unnecessary or futile,
should the doctor then go along with the patient’s wishes (following the rhetoric of
demand driven care), despite the fact that an operation might harm the patient (after
all, every surgical procedure involves certain risks), or should the doctor refuse?
And what if operating—although useless or unnecessary—would bring money, to
the doctor and to the hospital? Six of our surgeon respondents pointed out that this
might lead to tensions.
They perform gallbladder surgery here on people with relatively minor
complaints. Many people have gallstones and if they are not in much pain, I
doubt if an operation will do them much good (SU JM1, p. 4).
Look at oncology. If people suffer from terminal cancer, and you know that an
operation won’t do any good, many patients will say: all the same, even if
there’s only one percent chance of success, will you please operate? And as
the inﬂuence of the market grows, the doctor may say, well, I can sit here and
talk for an hour or so, to explain this patient that an operation is pointless. But
I may also think: he wants an operation, everybody tells me we ought to
deliver patient centred care, so I am politically correct if I operate, I get more
money if I operate, and I prefer operating to talking anyway. So what incentive
do I have left to explain my patient that he should not undergo surgery?
(SU OM1, p. 15).
Another surgeon reported that she would hold ﬁrm in this respect.
Sometimes I explain to my patients that surgery would not beneﬁt them. I tell
them: ‘I like to operate, that’s why I chose this profession, I earn money if I
operate on you, so sure, I could operate, but it would not be good for you’
(SU MV3, p. 9).
Another surgeon pointed out that surgery, unlike other specialties, would not
allow for this type of manipulation with indications.
You can’t fool around in surgery. You either have an inguinal rupture or you
don’t. […] You cannot fake in this profession. It is very difﬁcult to perform
unnecessary surgery. It’s always been like that. There was a doctor here who
specialised in throats and ears. If you do that type of thing you can look in all
sorts of body holes and say something about them. Quite easy to cheat. You
admit someone; have a look in one of his holes, you say: no lump there and
Bob’s your uncle (SU MV1, p. 14).
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[15]:
– Any medical performance by any doctor is a form of medicalization and thereby
potentially harmful.
– If a patient can recover without therapy or medication it is far better to forego
treatment.
– If a patient really needs medication or therapy, he should get it, but preferably as
little as possible.
– Thus, if a patient can be treated at home by his GP this is to be preferred over
hospital treatment. Hospital doctors tend to over treat, a hospital is a sickening
environment and hospital treatment takes the patient out of his private
surrounding which is unsettling and potentially unhealthy.
This GP interpretation of primum non nocere suited the Dutch government in the
1980s and 1990s. Hospital care is expensive and GPs were strict gatekeepers to
hospital care, thus contributing to the government’s intention to cut back on medical
care. Several GP respondents informed us about the traditional GP ideology.
That really put a mark on Dutch GPs. Don’t do anything unnecessary. And I
think, this whole idea of let’s keep it all affordable, that’s also part of what it
means to be a GP (GP OM3, p. 53).
It’s about being reticent […] To prevent unnecessary damage. And also
because of the costs (GP OM6, p. 27).
Many GP respondents (n = 22) felt that this medical professional principle, their
traditional GP ideology, was endangered by the marketization of health care. They
were treating conditions that did not really need treatment according to their former
ideology. They were performing examinations which they would have condemned
as unnecessary in the past.
For instance, say you’ve got a metal splinter in your eye. If I take it out with a
cotton swab I get 9 euros. If I use a tiny drill to get it out, that is classiﬁed as a
pseudo specialist intervention, and then I get 51 euros. So you see, it’s kind of
tempting to pick up the drill and get it out like that. While actually it’s not
necessary, and a drill always creates a little wound…So that’s a threshold for a
doctor. But I am sure there is more drilling going on than necessary (GP MM1,
p. 14).
Colleagues of mine want to invite all patients over 50 in their practice to make
an ECG. I ﬁnd that dubious. […] The same thing happens with a lung function
meter (GP MV2, p. 13).
A full blood examination. In the past I would wonder: what do you want with
it? […] And now I say: okay, patient wants it, ﬁne. I am not the one who’s
going to pay for it (GP MM3, p. 24).
Some GP respondents reported that they still want to cling to their traditional
reticence and that they don’t want to give in.
398 Health Care Anal (2011) 19:388–402
123GP medicine is like rowing upstream. Against the patient’s demand even. That
may sound strange, because you have to think along with your patient, but I
think that patients do ask a lot of unhealthy things (GP OM2, p. 31).
I think you should just hold ﬁrm. I sometimes say to a patient, look you’re not
in a supermarket here where you can come in and just take whatever you want.
It doesn’t work like that (GP MM3, p. 25).
However, the same GP also told that he felt he had no choice but to give in,
because he feared that patients would leave him and ﬁnd another GP.
The majority of GPs seem to be reinterpreting the do no harm principle. They
have discovered that patients are not harmed by examinations and blood tests. Quite
the contrary, patients seem to like it (GP MM1, p. 12). GPs have bought equipment
which enables them to examine patients in their own ofﬁce, rather than referring
them to a hospital, which contributes to the idea that patients will not be harmed, as
patients don’t have to spend half a day waiting in a hospital, they can be examined
on the spot (GP MV2, p. 10).
Although screenings and examinations do not harm patients and many patients
rather like to be examined thoroughly every now and then (GP MM4, p. 13),
screenings and examinations do cost a lot of money, while it is unclear whether they
will improve public health. In the past the costs of health care were an integral part
of the GPs ideology, of their particular interpretation of the do no harm principle.
This seems to have changed, due to marketization.
[Politicians] hoped to lower the costs of health care. But what you see is the
opposite. There’s a rising demand for total body scans and the like. Because
everybody wants to have everything and everything is being refunded by
health insurers (GP MV 3, p. 55).
You should not make GP care commercial. The minister is completely wrong
doing that. […] Because GPs will then try to please their patients and that is
not always what’s best for the patient (GP MM4, p. 33).
I think the argument that you should not harm your patient will remain
prominent. But cooperating to keep down the costs of health care; that’s not
appealing any more (GP MM1, p. 29).
Conclusion
During the 1990s and the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century a lot of things changed in
Dutch health care. Guidelines and standards for medical treatment became more
important due to a growing emphasis on evidence based care. Several laws were
adopted to strengthen the position of patients and patients’ organizations. The
economy went up and down, which had repercussions in the health care system.
And marketization was introduced. It is difﬁcult, perhaps even impossible to prove
that certain developments in daily practice brought up by our respondents (e.g. the
changes in diabetic care) were caused by marketization rather than, for example,
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one development.
Moreover, we have to be careful drawing conclusions based on a limited number
of interviews among just two medical specialties. What holds for surgeons in Dutch
hospitals need not necessarily hold for other specialists in Dutch hospitals, let alone
hospitals in other countries contemplating market reforms. Still we strove for
diversity among our respondents, and we explicitly asked them to relate their own as
well as other doctors’ experiences with and feelings about the market reforms. Also
it seems signiﬁcant that changes in medical professional ethics have occurred just a
few years after the introduction of market reforms. Our research shows that the
Dutch Council for Public Health and Health Care and the authors discussed in the
introduction were right when they pointed out that the introduction of market
elements in health care would challenge traditional medical professional ethics.
The ‘do not advertise principle’ has been abolished. Marketing activities seem to
be widespread in hospital surroundings and some marketing also goes on in GP
practices. Both GPs and surgeons are divided about this. Some physicians abhor the
self-promotion involved, others welcome the new opportunities, whereas yet others
consider this a fact of life, with which they will learn to live eventually.
The ‘distribute according to medical need’ principle has become less prominent
in hospitals. A lot of medical time and energy is spent on minor, routine operations
with which hospitals can make a lot of money. This sometimes goes to the detriment
of patients in need of major, risky surgical procedures. In GP practices more
attention goes to patients with chronic conditions who may arguably qualify as those
most in need of medical care.
Lastly, the primum non nocere principle is still being upheld in surgery. Among
GPs this principle gradually acquires a whole new meaning. Whereas it used to
mean: do not examine or treat a patient unless this is really necessary, it now comes
to mean: you may examine and treat a patient as he or she prefers as long as you do
not actually harm your patient. The traditional GP ideology, which may be
conceived as a very broad interpretation of the Do no harm principle, is challenged
most by the market elements in the new system.
Our ﬁndings are summarized in Table 2.






Substantial change: marketing has
become normal although some
surgeons dislike it
Small change: marketing is not very





Substantial change: much more
attention to minor afﬂictions
Small change in favour of patients with




Small change: surgeons feel tempted
to operate more, but do not give in
Substantial change: the do no harm principle is
reinterpreted. Medical attention is no longer
considered harmful per se
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123Obviously it is too early to render a ﬁnal verdict on the effects of market reforms
in the Dutch health care system. Some of our ﬁndings have advantages and
disadvantages. The advent of advertising due to competition among doctors and
hospitals could diminish patients’ trust in doctors, but it could also be appreciated as
a source of information. As to the other changes, neither of these would have to
create immediate problems if the costs of health care were allowed to expand. One
could then just pay for the extra time spent on minor surgery and on the growing
number of preventive examinations in GP practice, making sure that other patients
with other conditions would not have to suffer the consequences. However, recent
economic reports have pointed out that marketization has driven up costs and that
most of these costs are still paid with public money despite all the market rhetoric
[5, 16, 24]. If health care policy makers cannot accept ever rising costs and do not
want to defer costs to citizens’ private expenses, they should realize that
marketization within the boundaries of a public budget causes changes in
professional medical ethics. These changes should be weighed and taken into
account whenever further policy changes are considered.
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